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Abstract
In addition to the already present Climate and Energy package, the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) plans to include a binding target to reduce energy
consumption. We analyze the rationales the EU invokes to justify such
an overlapping and develop a minimal common framework to study inter-
actions arising from the combination of instruments reducing emissions,
promoting renewable energy (RE) production and reducing energy demand
through energy eﬃciency (EE) investments. We ﬁnd that although all in-
struments tend to reduce emissions and a price on carbon tends to give
the right incentives for RE and EE too, the combination of more than one
instrument leads to signiﬁcant antagonisms regarding major objectives of
the policy package. The model allows to show in a single framework and to
quantify the antagonistic eﬀects of the joint promotion of RE and EE. We
also show and quantify the eﬀects of this joint promotion on ETS permit
price, on wholesale market price and on energy production levels.
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1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) has developed an integrated climate and energy
strategy. Energy supply plays a central role in it, because of energy security con-
cerns but above all because it represents the biggest opportunities for greenhouse
gas (GHG) emission mitigation. According to the UNFCCC data (UNFCCC,
2011) the combustion of fossil energy makes up for 88 % of total GHG emissions
in the EU, and electricity and heat for 29 % of total emissions.
The EU implemented instruments aiming to curb GHG emissions by 20 %
compared to 1990 levels and to produce 20 % of its energy from renewable
sources by 2020. In addition, the EU plans to release an energy eﬃciency
directive including binding measures for energy consumption reductions, among
others. A wide range of research papers has investigated rationales, scope and
conditions for eﬃcient and eﬀective policies to reduce GHG emissions. But
given the high degree of interdependency between emissions, various energy
production sources and energy consumption reductions, interactions between
those policies are inevitably signiﬁcant.
What eﬀects have then to be expected when several policies are in place
to reduce emissions and promote renewable energy and energy eﬃciency sepa-
rately? In order to answer those questions, after a short analysis of rationales
to combine instruments we develop a minimal common framework including all
elements allowing to study policies of the Climate and Energy Package: a GHG
emitting energy, a renewable energy and energy eﬃciency investments possibil-
ities. By adding several instruments from the Package and by diﬀerentiating
the equilibrium, we investigate the interactions between instruments and the
channels through which they are eﬀective.
Part 2 analyzes the European policy framework and the rationales the EU
uses to justify climate and energy policy overlapping, before making a short
review on climate and energy policy interactions. Part 3 presents the minimal
common framework and analyzes interaction terms arising from the combination
of several price instruments and from the addition of an energy eﬃciency target.
Parts 4 and 5 summarize the results and conclude.
2 Climate and energy policies in Europe
2.1 Existing framework
The EU has published a roadmap for 2020 (UE, 2011b), where climate
change mitigation and energy objectives are among the 5 top priorities of the
global EU agenda. These objectives, known as the 3 × 20, are:
• a reduction in EU GHG emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels,
• 20% of EU energy consumption from renewable resources,
• a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected
levels, to be achieved by improving energy eﬃciency (EE).
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The EU implemented in this context an integrated climate-energy strategy and
developed principles of action, such as the climate policy mainstreaming and
the integration of climate objectives into sectoral policies.
Enforced in June 2009, the climate and energy (CE) package deﬁnes a legal
framework for designing and implementing policies to reach the 3×20 objectives.
It comprises four pieces of legislation:
• a revision of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) (UE, 2009b),
• an ‘Eﬀort Sharing Decision’ governing emissions from sectors outside
of the scope of the EU ETS (UE, 2009a),
• binding national targets for renewable energy which collectively will
lift the average renewable share across the EU to 20% by 2020 (UE,
2009d),
• a legal framework to promote the development of carbon capture and
storage (CCS) (UE, 2009c).
The energy eﬃciency objective is directly addressed by the energy eﬃciency ac-
tion plan (UE, 2011a), but the process for a binding legislation is still underway,
and European commissioner for energy Günther Oettinger has said he will give
EU countries two years to get energy eﬃciency savings back on track before
proposing legally binding targets4.
The CE package strengthens the ETS, designed to share eﬀorts among mem-
ber states (MS). It sets binding targets at the national level for renewable pro-
duction, letting MS chose the best suited instrument to reach it. Most member
states use a feed-in tariﬀ where renewable energy installations receive long-term
contracts that guarantee preferential access to the grid at an elevated price.
Some countries put up a quota system, where obligated parties (energy compa-
nies most of the time) have to provide a certain amount of green certiﬁcates,
issued for each unit of renewable energy produced. In the US, a similar system
called renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is widely used. Other instruments
include preferential loans and ﬁscal treatment, investment subsidies, tenders
and net-metering5. Finally, the EC package sets good practice principles and a
framework to monitor and assess actions of member states.
Energy eﬃciency legislation is more sector-oriented, due to the scattered na-
ture of energy savings. Current legislation focuses on especially energy-intensive
sectors such as buildings, manufacturing, energy conversion and transport. It
includes directives for energy labeling, ecodesign of products, building perfor-
mance and combined heat and power production6. Recently published energy
eﬃciency plan is part of a negotiation process for the deﬁnition of a future
directive concerning energy eﬃciency that may include binding targets (UE,
2011d).
4Source: Euractiv/Reuters 26 September 2011 http://www.euractiv.com/energy-eﬃciency/
doublespeak-energy-eﬃciency-eu-states-told-news-507879
5“Net metering service means service to an electric consumer under which electric energy
generated by that electric consumer from an eligible on-site generating facility and delivered
to the local distribution facilities may be used to oﬀset electric energy provided by the electric
utility to the electric consumer during the applicable billing period” (cited from EERE, http:
//www.eere.energy.gov/).
6See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/energy_legislation_by_policy_areas.pdf for a complete
overview of the secondary EU legislation under the competence of the DG ENER.
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2.2 Rationales for combining policies
According to basic economic theory, a single CO2 price across the whole
economy is the most eﬃcient policy for mitigating emissions, because it al-
lows for a ﬁrst best allocation of resources. This perfect allocation is however
never reached in reality, because of several shortcomings in the emission mar-
ket. Market failures, technological failures and regulatory failures prevent the
emission market from ﬁnding the right equilibrium. In the short term, the ab-
sence of transmission of CO2 price eﬀects to end-users, imperfect information
and bounded rationality can limit the eﬃciency and relevance of the emission
market. In the medium term, security of supply concerns, imperfect compe-
tition and liquidity constraints can hinder the proper evolution of the permit
price trajectory. In the long term, innovation failures and market barriers limit
the emergence of low carbon technologies.
As stated by Tinbergen (1952), ideally each of these externalities or market
failures should be tackled by a speciﬁc instrument. Otherwise, a trade-oﬀ would
have to be found that would favor one objective over another. More generally,
Sorrell (2003) cites three justiﬁcations for adding an instrument to the carbon
price set by the European ETS:
• to improve the design of the ETS (by regulating a sector not covered
by the scheme, for instance),
• to correct market failures of the ETS that reduce the eﬃciency of
the scheme,
• to meet other objectives besides emission mitigation.
Regarding the EU policy package, energy eﬃciency and renewable promotion
instruments can be seen as improving in some way the ETS. In principle, their
scope is non contiguous to the ETS. They are designed to deal with sectors
not covered by the emission quotas, like distributed electricity generation or
scattered eﬃciency potential, in order to reach additional emission reductions
(see for instance impact assessments UE (2008, p. 34) and UE (2011c, p. 10)).
Mitigating market failures is nevertheless also often invoked as justiﬁcation
for a number of instruments promoting renewables and energy eﬃciency in the
EU. Several directives set guidelines for promoting R&D of capital-intensive low-
carbon technologies in order to overcome innovation failures and limit market
barriers in the long run. Other instruments seek to limit the learning-by-doing
spillovers by ensuring investors capture the full beneﬁt of knowledge from the
construction and exploitation of low-carbon technologies. Most renewable feed-
in tariﬀ schemes can thus be seen as a payback for the failure to capture beneﬁts
from learning-by-doing. Many tax incentive schemes and preferable loans seek
to limit liquidity constraints and market barriers due to high initial costs of some
technologies. Labels are designed to limit asymmetric and imperfect informa-
tion, and labeling of goods is a major instrument of the European strategy to
promote energy eﬃciency. In the EU, direct command-and-control regulations
such as minimal energy eﬃciency thresholds are frequently used. For an exhaus-
tive list of climate policy instruments and their potential impact on deviation
from perfect markets, see Gillingham and Sweeney (2010). See also Gillingham
et al. (2009) for a review of economic concepts underlying energy eﬃciency de-
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cision making and a review of market barriers, market failures, and behavioral
failure related to energy eﬃciency.
Moreover, positive externalities associated with the development of low car-
bon technologies are often invoked by the EU to justify additional support for
these technologies. In EC directive n◦ 2009/28/EC, following side-objectives are
cited: “promoting the security of energy supply, promoting technological devel-
opment and innovation and providing opportunities for employment and re-
gional development, especially in rural and isolated areas,[...] export prospects,
social cohesion and employment opportunities for independent energy produc-
ers” (UE, 2009d, p16).
Two diﬀerent logics seem to coexist in the European climate and energy
policy scheme. The ﬁrst one places the climate mitigation objective as the
main driver of economic changes, and other instruments are thought to limit
the market failures that cannot be tackled by the European ETS. Energy ef-
ﬁciency and renewable energy policies are thus aiming at reducing knowledge
and technology-based failures of the carbon market related to speciﬁc low-carbon
technologies. The second logic considers several objectives together. Reaching
20 % of renewable energy production and 20 % of energy consumption reduc-
tions are important objectives in themselves, because of additional beneﬁts they
bring along.
This opposition shows at diﬀerent levels. The ﬁrst logic could be the view
of a pure economist. The second one places more emphasis on technologies and
is more end-sector oriented. At the European level for instance, the Climate
Action DG argued in favor of the ﬁrst whereas the Energy DG plead for the
second.
2.3 Incidence of overlapping policies
Regardless of the reason invoked for their implementation, climate and en-
ergy policy instruments considered in this paper aﬀect energy-related goods that
are highly interchangeable. A change in renewable promotion will aﬀect relative
prices between alternative energy sources and have an eﬀect on consumption of
fossil energy. Comparably, energy eﬃciency-promoting instruments will aﬀect
the shape and the absolute level of the demand curve. In a more general sense,
interactions can aﬀect expected outcomes at any level: scope, objectives, imple-
mentation, operation or timing of a speciﬁc policy (derived from Sorrell, 2003,
p.424). For an exhaustive review of interaction studies and a general framework
to assess potential eﬀects of interaction between two instruments or two policy
schemes, see for instance Oikonomou and Jepma (2008).
In the literature, several approaches are used to study interactions. Some
authors try to classify interactions in diﬀerent manners, mostly on the basis
of eﬀect on expected outcomes, scope and governance (Sorrell, 2003, Sorrell
et al., 2003). Other analyze and sometimes try to quantify those eﬀects, using
analytical or numerical models (Skytte, 2006, Sorrell et al., 2009, Abrell and
Weigt, 2010). A last category of papers uses a sectoral approach to highlight
interaction, mainly in the electricity generation sector (Traber and Kemfert,
2009, Fischer and Preonas, 2010).
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As deﬁned by Sorrell (2003), a relevant distinction between direct and indi-
rect interactions can be based upon aﬀected targeted groups. Direct interactions
occur when groups targeted by two policy instruments overlap in some way. An
indirect interaction takes place between two policy instruments when a target
group is indirectly aﬀected by one of the instruments, as when a renewable obli-
gation on electricity producers and a tax on downstream electricity consumption
both raise electricity price for end-users.
The INTERACT project report (Sorrell et al., 2003) makes further distinc-
tions between internal and external interactions, and between vertical and hor-
izontal interactions. Internal interaction refers to an interaction between two
or more climate policy instruments whereas external to interactions between a
climate and a non-climate policy instrument. Horizontal interaction refers to
the same level of governance (the European level for instance) while vertical
interactions refer to diﬀerent levels. The report also deﬁnes trade policy inter-
actions as the inﬂuence of one policy instrument on another by the exchange of
an environmental trading commodity.
Analyzing mechanisms behind interactions, Skytte (2006) and Sorrell et al.
(2009) develop graphical equilibrium analysis frameworks to separate eﬀects in
each considered market (environmental commodity, electricity or energy eﬃ-
ciency goods) and to distinguish eﬀects on demand curve from eﬀects on supply
curve. They show in a graphical way that the promotion of one type of energy
displaces demand and supply curves for all types of commodities, having an
ambiguous eﬀect on prices. Abrell and Weigt (2010) develop a static general
computable equilibrium model of Germany with diﬀerentiated renewable tech-
nologies to test the eﬀects of an emission trading scheme and renewable support
mechanisms on each other. They show that adding an instrument promoting
renewables to an ETS decreases environmental eﬀectiveness by letting the car-
bon price drop to zero in some cases. This addition decreases also total welfare
due to the additional ﬁnancing needs of the renewable support scheme. This
additional cost is highly sensitive on the learning rate assumptions for low car-
bon technologies. Numerical sectoral approaches, as developed by Traber and
Kemfert (2009) allow to be more speciﬁc on supply technologies and quantify
synergies between instruments. They show two frequently counteracting eﬀects
when combining an European ETS and national renewable promotion schemes:
a substitution eﬀect and a permit price eﬀect. The latter occurs when substitut-
ing renewables to emitting fossil production. Increased renewable production
then reduces total emissions, thus reducing the price of emission permits and
the end-user price. But promoting renewables substitutes to fossil energy a
more expansive energy, increasing therefore the ﬁnal price and leading to the
substitution eﬀect.
Fischer and Preonas (2010) develop a static partial equilibrium analytical
framework enabling to analyze variations in quantities and prices when various
policies are combined. Applying it to the American electricity production sector,
they discuss perverse eﬀects of the addition of an emission cap or a renewable
quota to a set of price-instruments (carbon tax, renewable subsidy or fossil
fuel tax). The ﬁrst major result is that overlapping price-instruments with an
emission cap can lead to the development of relative dirty technologies. When an
emission cap is in place, instruments raising the emission permit price discourage
dirty technologies, whereas instruments that lower the emissions price allow
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dirty technologies to displace cleaner ones. In other terms, “when emissions are
capped, none of the overlapping policies can simultaneously disadvantage both
kinds of fossil generation” (Fischer and Preonas, 2010, p. 16). This merit-order
eﬀect has been previously described by Böhringer and Rosendahl (2009). The
second major result is that when price instruments are combined to a renewable
portfolio standard (RPS), any additional taxation of fossil energy will lower
generation from renewable sources because of the market share constraint of
the RPS.
Above described approaches tend to focus either on graphical or qualita-
tive approaches or on speciﬁc interactions between two instruments, mostly
the EU-ETS and an instrument promoting renewable energy. A comprehen-
sive microeconomic approach of interactions between three objectives and three
instruments is still lacking. This paper focuses on microeconomic interactions
between all objectives of the Climate and Energy Package. It is an attempt
to complement the previous approaches, more governance-oriented, by giving
formal microeconomic deﬁnitions and analytical demonstrations of interaction
eﬀects. It leaves behind macroeconomic and systemic eﬀects of interactions,
describing a common microeconomic framework for climate and energy pol-
icy interactions. It will use and expand the framework developed in Fischer
and Preonas (2010) by adding demand reductions through energy eﬃciency in-
vestments and considering the overlapping of quantity instruments promoting
energy eﬃciency.
3 A minimal common framework to study micro-
economic mechanisms of interaction eﬀects
This section presents a framework integrating two types of energy sources
and several policy instruments to analyze mechanisms by which interactions
aﬀect quantities and prices. The methodology, derived from Fischer and Preonas
(2010) is extended to a system with investments in energy eﬃciency and applied
to instruments of the European energy and climate policy scheme. We examine
eﬃciency of policies along three objectives: emission reductions, renewables and
energy savings development. The ﬁrst part will introduce the general framework.
Following parts will examine a situation with several price instruments included
and where the energy demand is reduced by a quota. Annex A lists all variables
used in the model.
3.1 General framework
Two energies are combined to satisfy an exogenous demand in energy (D):
the energy from a fossil fuel (f) and the energy from a renewable source (r).
This energy, accounted in Joules or in MWh, is assumed to be consumed through
a non-speciﬁed energetic vector, for instance electricity, in order to satisfy a ser-
vice such as lighting, transportation or heating. The demand can be reduced
by an amount e through energy eﬃciency investments. This reduction refers
to the production of the same energy service with a diﬀerent eﬃciency. For
instance, it can be the electricity savings following a switch to energy saving
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bulbs or a switch to an A+ labeled appliance. These reductions do not refer
to suﬃciency behaviors, where end-users adapt their consumption to price or
speciﬁc programs. For a detailed discussion of the diﬀerences between eﬃciency
and suﬃciency, see Giraudet et al. (2011a,b). Suﬃciency is represented by the
decreasing slope of the net demand function. It represents all energy saving be-
havior components not related to technological improvement and which cannot
be easily subsidized. The gross demand D is deﬁned by a function decreasing
with the wholesale price p (D0(p) ≤ 0). It has to be satisﬁed according to
following equation:
f + r = D(p) − e (1)
The cost of producing energy from the two diﬀerent sources (Cf and Cr) is
assumed to be in both cases growing and convex (C0
f(f) ≥ 0, C00
f(f) > 0 and
C0
r(r) ≥ 0, C00







(∂i)2 ). Decreasing re-
turns can be justiﬁed by the static framework adopted. With a given technology
mix and production capacity, each energy producer uses ﬁrst the most eﬃcient
installations and moves gradually to costlier ones, according to the merit order.
Energy savings e are provided by investments in energy eﬃciency, assumed to
have also decreasing returns with respect to the energy savings, for the same
reasons. Thus we also have C0
e(e) ≥ 0, C00
e (e) > 0.
We consider the following standard price-instruments, applying to energy
goods:
• a tax on emissions from fossil fuel (φ ≥ 0),
• a subsidy on renewable production (ρ ≥ 0),
• a subsidy on energy eﬃciency ( ≥ 0).
The tax on emissions from fossil fuel is often referred to as a carbon tax, and has
been implemented in various form in several European countries. The renewable
production subsidy can represent a feed-in tariﬀ, an instrument widely used
among European countries. The subsidy on energy eﬃciency represents for
instance a white certiﬁcate scheme, where participants must provide a certain
amount of certiﬁcate at the end of each period. The white certiﬁcate are issued
for each unit of energy saved compared to a baseline scenario. The future
European directive under discussion considers to force the implementation of
such a scheme in all member states.
The two energies and the energy-eﬃcient goods allowing to reduce demand
are produced by representative producers, assumed to be price-takers and sat-
isfying following symmetric proﬁt-maximization programs:
max
f
πf = (p − φ) · f − Cf(f) for production from fossil source
max
r
πr = (p + ρ) · r − Cr(r) for production from renewable source
max
e πe = (p + ) · e − Ce(e) for energy savings from eﬃcient goods
with f,r,e ≥ 0 and p the wholesale price. In this setting, the wholesale price
is the one faced by producers and comprises neither the tax and subsidy nor
the public cost of the policy. For simplicity, we only consider the ﬁnal savings
of eﬃcient goods and tune the cost curve accordingly. Put diﬀerently, we only
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consider the energy saving part of eﬃcient goods. When replacing an old refrig-
erator for example, the choice is between taking an average-rated one or a more
eﬃcient one. The cost diﬀerence between both can be here seen as an energy
eﬃciency investment. This investment leads to a saving corresponding to the
consumption diﬀerence between both appliances during a given time. Consid-
ering the energy savings allows to develop a quasi-symmetric framework useful
to apprehend interaction eﬀects. The cost function Ce(e) thus gives the portion
of the total cost of a given eﬃcient good corresponding to the energy savings.
First-order conditions for the three proﬁt-maximization programs give fol-
lowing system:
C0
f(f) = p − φ (2)
C0
r(r) = p + ρ (3)
C0
e(e) = p +  (4)
Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) deﬁne the market equilibrium. For simplicity
reasons and to best describe real conditions, we assume that all variables are
strictly positive.
3.2 Introducing price and quantity derivatives
We totally diﬀerentiate the market equilibrium equations (1), (2), (3) and
(4), giving us following system to study instantaneous and inﬁnitesimal varia-
tions of wholesale price, energy quantities and energy savings:
dp = (df + dr + de)/D0(p) (5)
df = (dp − dφ)/C00
f(f) (6)
dr = (dp + dρ)/C00
r (r) (7)
de = (dp + d)/C00
e (e) (8)
Solving this system for df, dr, de and dp, gives following equations, describing
variations in wholesale price, energy quantities and energy savings as a function
of the various policy changes:
df =
−dφ · (ηfηr + ηfηe + ηfηD) − dρ · ηfηr − d · ηfηe
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(9)
dr =
dρ · (ηrηf + ηrηe + ηrηD) + dφ · ηrηf − d · ηrηe
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(10)
de =
d · (ηeηf + ηeηr + ηeηD) + dφ · ηeηf − dρ · ηeηr
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(11)
dp =
dφ · ηf − dρ · ηr − d · ηe
ηf + ηr + ηe + ηD
(12)
where ηi( with i ∈ {f,r,e}) is deﬁned as ηi = 1
C00
i ≥ 0 and corresponds to the
derivative of the inverse supply function with respect to price ηi = 1/C00
i (q) =
(C0−1
i )0(p + αi) for both energy types and the energy savings, with αi referring
to price instruments (αi ≤ 0 for taxes and αi ≥ 0 for subsidies). The inverse
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supply function corresponds to the marginal cost curve if we consider a pure
competition framework with price-taking producers. ηD is deﬁned as ηD =
−D0(q) ≥ 0 in order to have a positive variable and facilitate the comparison
with marginal cost curve derivatives.
Note that all η, including ηD are homogeneous to a variation of a quantity
with respect to price, and they are all positive. Note also that all η are functions
of quantities and prices. For a better lecture we often omit variables, but the η
should be read: ηf = ηf(f), ηr = ηr(r), ηe = ηe(e) and ηD = ηD(p)
In equations (9), (10), (11) and (12), the coeﬃcient of policy variables dφ,
dρ and d corresponds to the partial derivatives of respective quantity or price
variables with respect to corresponding policy variable. For instance, in equation
(9), the coeﬃcient of dφ corresponds to the partial derivative of fossil production




ηf+ηr+ηe+ηD . It corresponds to the
variation of fossil production when the carbon tax is changing.
In this example, the partial derivative is negative, meaning that increasing
the carbon tax reduces energy production from fossil fuel at equilibrium. This is
due to several eﬀects. Increasing the tax increases the marginal cost of producing
energy from fossil fuel. This increase shifts the supply curve C0−1
f (p−φ) down-
wards (because it is an increasing function), raising the price at equilibrium.
This shift is characterized by expression −ηfηD in equation (9), corresponding
to the product of fossil energy supply curve and the opposite demand curve.
An increase in φ will also have an eﬀect on ηf itself, indirectly changing the
slope of the supply curve. If C00
f is increasing with respect to production, the
partial derivative of the fossil energy supply curve with respect to carbon tax
is negative: ∂C0−1
f (p − φ)/∂φ = (−1) · 1/C00
f(C0−1
f (p − φ)) ≤ 0. The decreasing
slope of the supply curve adds up to the downward shift, leading to eﬀects that
add-up.
This increase reduces also the relative cost of renewable energy and energy
savings compared to energy from fossil fuel. The change in relative costs in-
duces a substitution between fossil energy and the two other energetic options,
renewable energy and energy eﬃciency. This substitution is characterized by
expressions −ηfηr and −ηfηe in equation (9). The symmetric expression can be
found in equations (10) and (11). All above eﬀects are tempered by the sum of
all supply curves and the demand curve. The substitutions and the tempering
can be seen as a ﬁrst eﬀect of instrument combination.
Table 1 summarizes the signs of the partial derivatives of both energy types
(f,r), energy savings (e) and market price (p) with respect to the policy instru-
ment levels (φ,ρ and ). For instance, a – sign on the intersection of column df
and line dφ means that
∂f
∂φ is negative, an increase in φ comes with a decrease
in f at equilibrium. The rate of variation of the market price is negative with
respect to subsidies ρ and  because we do not consider the funding of those
policy instruments.
As mentioned in Fischer and Preonas (2010), the resulting changes in the
wholesale price (equation (12)) can be interpreted as the weighted average of
the tax and subsidy changes for all energetic goods. Note that 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1,
i ∈ {f,r,e}, and 0 ≤ αf + αr + αe ≤ 1.
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df dr de dp
dφ – + + +
dρ – + – –
d – – + –
Table 1: Signs of the partial derivatives of both energy types (f,r), energy
savings (e) and market price (p) with respect to the policy instrument levels
(φ,ρ and )
Equations (9), (10), (11) and (12) can also be interpreted as a whole, inter-
preting the eﬀect on price or production of a combined change of two separate
instrument levels. For instance, an increase of both φ and ρ will have two neg-
ative eﬀects on fossil energy production that adds up. Similarly, an increase in
both φ and  will have two positive eﬀects on energy savings that adds up. By
contrast, an increase in both ρ and  will have an ambiguous eﬀect on renewable
production, as the two eﬀects have opposite signs. In this framework, we can
give following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 1 (synergy). Two policy instruments are in synergy with respect
to a given variable (like production or price) when their partial derivative with
respect to this variable have the same sign.
Deﬁnition 2 (antagonism). Two policy instruments have antagonists eﬀects
with respect to a given variable (like production or price) when their partial
derivative with respect to this variable have opposite sign.
Here, subsidies for renewable energy and energy savings are antagonistic for
renewable production and energy savings. A simultaneous increase in the level
of the subsidies will result in an ambiguous eﬀect on renewable production and
on savings resulting from energy eﬃciency.
3.3 Addition of an energy eﬃciency target
To represent an energy eﬃciency target, we assume that all accountable
reductions are made through energy eﬃciency investments. This is true for
instance for the French white certiﬁcate scheme, where certiﬁcate are issued
on the basis of standard procedures such as the replacement of an appliance.
Additional consumption reduction can be the result of suﬃciency behaviors.
Those reductions are however diﬃcult to account for. In the present setting,
they are captured by the decreasing slope of the demand curve, or a possible
shift to the left. Change in the energy price resulting from various policies can
also lead to a rebound eﬀect. A demand reduction will induce a price drop that
itself lead to an demand increase.
For simplicity, we therefore display an energy eﬃciency target as a demand
reduction requirement e?, corresponding to a certain percentage of total con-
sumption. Global energy demand has to be lowered by a certain percentage
A compared to the business-as-usual scenario. We moreover assume that the
quota is binding. By doing so, we simply assume Ce is bigger than Cr and Cf:
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other energy types are cheaper. This seems reasonable, otherwise promotion of
energy eﬃciency would be unnecessary.
In the equations, all goods are linked by the quota constraint : e = A D(p) =




(df + dr) +
dA
1 − A
(f + r + e) (13)
The system is resolved with following equations:
df =
−dφ · (ηfηr + ηf(1 − A)ηD) − dρ · ηfηr − dA · ηf · D(p)
ηf + ηr + (1 − A)ηD
(14)
dr =
−dρ · (ηrηf + ηr(1 − A)ηD) − dφ · ηfηr − dA · ηr · D(p)
ηf + ηr + (1 − A)ηD
(15)
de =
dφ · A ηfηD − dρ · A ηrηD + dA · D(p) · (ηf + ηr + ηD)
(1 − A)ηD + ηf + ηr
(16)
dp =
dφ · ηf − dρ · ηr − dA · D(p)
ηf + ηr + (1 − A)ηD
(17)
This system can be analyzed in the same way as the previous one. In equations
(14), (15), (16) and (17), the coeﬃcient of dφ, dρ and dA correspond to the
partial derivatives of price and quantities with respect to the policy instrument.
Compared to the general framework with only price instruments, the addition
of a consumption reduction quota simpliﬁes the system by removing some of
the substitutions. This is due to the additional constraint, linking the energy
savings to total demand, and reducing the number of variables in the system.
With this constraint binding, the variations of e are due to the variation of
the global energy demand, and are reducible to a shift along the demand curve
(expressions (A ηfηD) and (−A ηrηD) in equation (16)). This eﬀect is tempered
by some substitutions between e and r, and between e and f, at a level depending
on the relative slopes of inverse demand functions. Equation (14) and (15) thus
display only one substitution term, symmetrical to the corresponding one in
equation (16).
The addition of a consumption reduction quota aﬀects the slope of the de-
mand curve. The quota permanently reduces the demand and therefore it acts
as if the slope of the demand curve was lower, and the slope ηD is replaced by
(1 − A)ηD compared to before the addition of the quota. This change of the
demand curve slope has an eﬀect on energy production when the quota A is
moving. An increase in the quota level rises the energy savings compared to
renewable and fossil energy productions (
∂f
∂A ≤ 0 and ∂r
∂A ≤ 0). The eﬀect on
the wholesale price follows this move of the demand curve and decreases too, at
a rate proportional to BAU demand (i.e. the demand without the savings).
Table 2 summarizes the signs of rates of variations of both energy types
(f,r), energy savings (e), market price (p) and certiﬁcate shadow price () with
respect to policy instrument levels (φ,ρ and A). The certiﬁcate shadow price is
deﬁned in the next section. Results are comparable as those presented in Table
1. Table 2 highlights some synergies and antagonisms (as deﬁned in previous
section). To cite the most notable eﬀects, renewable subsidies and energy saving
quota are antagonists with respect to energy saving promotion and renewable
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df dr de dp d
dφ – + + + –
dρ – + – – +
dA – – + – +
Table 2: Signs of rate of variations of both energy types (f,r), energy savings
(e) and market price (p) and certiﬁcate shadow price () with respect to policy
instrument levels (φ,ρ and A)
production. Renewable subsidies and carbon tax are antagonists regarding the
level of the certiﬁcate price, as well as energy saving quota and carbon tax.
Certiﬁcate price
With a consumption reduction quota, the constraint on energy savings e is
quantitative.  becomes an equivalent of a shadow price, or an indication of the
price of a white certiﬁcate if the consumption reduction quota is backed by a
certiﬁcate market. It can be seen as an addition to the wholesale price for the
energy savings, in order to help them become competitive compared to energy
production. Formally, it corresponds to the spread between the wholesale price p
and the marginal cost of energy savings C0
e. Replacing de in the quota constraint
(13) and solving for d gives:
d =
dρ · (ηr(ηe + AηD)) − dφ · (ηf(ηe + AηD)) + dA · D(p) (ηe + ηf + ηr + ηD)
ηfηe + ηrηe + (1 − A)ηeηD
(18)
Changes in the carbon tax or the renewable subsidy will cause some substitu-
tions between fossil and renewable energy, and move the equilibrium price. An
increase in renewable subsidy dρ will raise the certiﬁcate price, by increasing the
spread between wholesale price and marginal cost of energy savings. On the
contrary, the carbon tax, by raising the wholesale price p decreases this spread
and causes the certiﬁcate price to fall.
A change in the quota level dA has several impacts. First, it moves the
demand curve, causing the wholesale price to drop, and consequently the cer-
tiﬁcate price to raise. Second, it causes the relative share of the energy savings
to raise compared to renewable and fossil energy, leading to an increase of the
marginal cost of energy savings, and thus an increase in .
It is noteworthy that when an energy eﬃciency quota is in place, the energy
savings cost curve has no impact on the equilibrium any more. Put diﬀerently,
it is as if investments in energy eﬃciency were no longer the result of proﬁt-
maximizing decisions.
3.4 Addition of price and quantity instruments to an emission
quota
This framework allows to analyze impacts of instrument combination on the
ETS permit price. In order to do so, we model a binding emission reduction
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quota as a ﬁxed energy production from fossil fuel. The quota being binding,
the emissions are constant, and thus fossil production is ﬁxed. This translates
in following constraint:
df = 0
φ becomes the shadow price of the emission constraint, equal to the absolute
value of the spread between market price and the marginal cost of producing
energy from a fossil fuel. φ can be interpreted as a proxy of the ETS permit
price.
Addition of two price instruments




ηr + ηe + ηD
− d
ηe
ηr + ηe + ηD
(19)
We see that an increase in either the renewable or the energy saving subsidy has
a negative impact on the emission permit price, weighted by a ratio denoting the
substitution between fossil energy and alternatives to fossil energy when they
are subsidized. When for instance renewable energy is subsidized, it increases
its market share compared to fossil energy. This reduces the burden on fossil
energy producers, it is less costly to comply with the emission quota and the
permit price drops.
This result illustrates the recent debate the necessity to “set aside” some
of the emission permits in parallel of implementing energy-eﬃciency measures,
in order to prevent the carbon price to collapse. An increased objective on
renewable energy production or energy savings would put a downward pressure
on carbon price, weakening the price signal given to the whole economy.
Addition of a renewable subsidy and a consumption reduction quota




ηr + (1 − A)ηD
− dA
D(p)
ηr + (1 − A)ηD
(20)
The results are comparable to the situation with only price instruments. An
increase in the energy saving quota will have a negative inﬂuence on the emission
permit price. This time only, the magnitude of the inﬂuence is proportional to
total demand and not the slope of the curve, resulting in a potentially larger
eﬀect on permit price.
4 Summary of results
Regarding the primary objective of the European climate and energy strat-
egy, namely the reduction of GHG emissions, the model shows that all the in-
struments considered reduce fossil energy consumption and therefore associated
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GHG emissions (see Tables 1 and 2). The impact of diﬀerent instruments on
the wholesale price is however variable. If the impact on public ﬁnance is over-
looked and no charge is put on end-users, a carbon tax will raise the price with
the emission reductions whereas renewable and energy saving subsidies lower it.
Interaction between emission permits and subsidies for renewable energy pro-
duction and energy savings is negative. At equilibrium, the two subsidies reduce
the emission permit price. This allows to understand the current “set-aside” de-
bate about the EU-ETS. Strengthening the renewable production objective has
a negative impact on the ETS price, as it has been seen for forward products
on the carbon markets. A set-aside of some of the emission permits would help
keep the market under pressure and would help guarantee a high permit price
to reassure investors.
Regarding all objectives of the Climate and Energy Package, the model
shows that a carbon tax promotes at the same time the reduction of fossil energy
consumption, the development of renewable energy and consumption reductions
through energy eﬃciency investments. In the presence of quantiﬁed objectives
for renewables and energy savings, this instrument may however not be suﬃ-
cient. It only ensures renewable energy and consumption reductions evolve in
the right direction, not that they will reach the speciﬁed target. Instruments
speciﬁcally promoting renewables and energy eﬃciency have to be added to the
system to ensure renewable production is above and energy consumption below
targeted levels. When they are implemented together, the two subsidies have
however opposite eﬀects on market price and tend to reduce the absolute level
of each other.
We give a formal deﬁnition of synergistic and antagonist eﬀects in the model.
Two policy instruments have antagonists eﬀects with respect to a given variable
(like production or price) when their partial derivative with respect to this vari-
able have opposite signs. Two policy instruments are in synergy when those
partial derivatives have the same sign. When they are implemented together,
a carbon tax, a renewable subsidy and an energy saving subsidy have antag-
onist eﬀects with respect to market price. The two subsidy are antagonistic
with respect to renewable production and energy savings. The promotion of
renewables comes at the expense of energy savings promotion and vice versa.
Those instruments allow however to bring the market price down, mitigating the
eﬀect of the carbon tax. The fact that renewables and energy eﬃciency invest-
ments are complementary (regarding their standing in the climate and energy
strategies) explains why they are linked in most policy bundles but advocates
for a single instrument promoting both. This analysis holds in a static point
of view and ignores in particular technology-based market failures justifying
technology-speciﬁc promotion such as wind feed-in-tariﬀ.
According to the model, the addition of a consumption reduction quota or a
white certiﬁcate scheme has some eﬀects on the demand. By reducing the net
demand, the energy saving quota reduces the need for fossil energy (and thus
GHG emissions) and reduces the market price. But energy eﬃciency investments
are in competition with renewables and in the model, an increase of the quota
comes with a decrease in renewable production at equilibrium. Furthermore, an
increase of the consumption reduction quota is followed by a decrease in carbon
price. This decrease is proportional to total demand, resulting in a potentially
large eﬀect on permit price.
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5 Conclusion
After having discussed the rationales the EU gives to justify climate and
energy instruments, we develop in this paper a stylized analytical model of the
European energy sector. It is an attempt to develop a minimal common frame-
work to study interactions between all elements of the Climate and Energy
Package. We use it to understand the interaction mechanisms between policy
instruments from the Climate and Energy Package and future instruments re-
ducing ﬁnal energy demand by promoting energy eﬃciency investments. We
give a formal deﬁnition of synergistic and antagonist interaction eﬀects. We
show that regarding the objective of GHG emission reductions all instruments
are eﬀective, but that major antagonisms arise when several objectives are con-
sidered concerning wholesale and emission permit price as well as renewable
energy production and energy saving levels. We address the question with two
types of energies, one emitting and one renewable.
In a very broad sense, one instrument allows to control the absolute produc-
tion of one energy type, but it only ensures that the other energy types evolve
in the right direction. Additional instruments are needed to control the abso-
lute production of several energy types at the same time, but at the expense
of possible antagonisms between instruments. With three constraints, as con-
sidered in this model, it is possible to control the absolute production of three
energy types. The absolute level of price can be controlled, but at the expense
of loosing the control on one energy type production level. In the existence of
an objective on the price level (for distributional reasons for example), an ad-
ditional constraint is also necessary, but is likely to have a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on welfare.
In our model, a single carbon price allows to reduce fossil fuel production.
Additional measures are necessary to ensure renewable energy and energy con-
sumption reductions are above targeted levels. Those additional measures re-
duce the eﬃciency of any instrument taken independently. Putting a price on
renewable energy or energy eﬃciency promotion reduces the carbon price, and
thus the incentive of carbon-free investment economy wide. The joint promotion
of renewable energy and energy eﬃciency has antagonist eﬀects by substitut-
ing renewables to energy savings and vice-versa. This justiﬁes current concerns
about a future carbon price drop following the tightening of renewable or energy
eﬃciency development objectives.
We model the introduction of a binding consumption reduction objective.
We show that by reducing the net demand, the energy eﬃciency quota reduces
GHG emissions and reduces the market price. This leads however again to an-
tagonist eﬀects with instruments promoting renewables. Despite having several
positive eﬀects on its own (like lower dependency on energy imports, lower fu-
ture capital-intensive investment needs and additional positive externalities such
as local employment), a demand reduction instrument may not be compatible
with other instruments in the Climate and Energy Package.
The existence of these interactions suggests the need for an integrated ap-
proach of climate and energy policy deﬁnition. The objectives have to be tuned
together, and instrument levels have to be deﬁned taking into account all other
instruments. If considered important, the price reduction objective (through
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energy markets liberalization), a European priority not so long ago, should also
be integrated into the deﬁnition process. This work has to be completed along
several directions. The introduction of a welfare function would allow to discrim-
inate two policy bundles on an absolute basis, whereas deﬁning some functional
forms for supply and demand would allow to illustrate some of the eﬀects shown
here.
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Ci Cost curve for energetic good i
C0
i Marginal cost curve for good i
C00
i Marginal cost curve variation for i
ηi Slope of the supply curve of good i
ηD Opposite of the demand curve slope
φ Carbon tax
ρ Renewable energy subsidy
 Energy savings subsidy
A Consumption reduction quota
dα Small variations of variable α
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